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BUSINESS OWNERS' DUTY TO REMOVE ICE AND
SNOW
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2001, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court,
decided for the first time in Budzko v. One City Center Associates Limited Partner-
ship,1 what duty of care a business landowner owes to business invitees regarding
the accumulation of ice and snow during a storm. 2 Terry Budzko slipped and fell
as she was exiting One City Center, the building in which her employer leased
office space. 3 The steps had not been shoveled or sanded and a snowstorm had
been progressing throughout the day.4 The Law Court, placing heavy reliance on
the factor of foreseeability, held that "[blusiness owners have a duty to reasonably
respond to foreseeable dangers and keep premises reasonably safe when signifi-
cant numbers of invitees may be anticipated to enter or leave the premises during
a winter storm."'5 Without saying what measures would have satisfied this duty,
the Law Court held that One City Center's failure to treat the steps with salt or
sand, shovel any of the accumulation, or warn any of the invitees of the condition
of the premises did not satisfy the duty placed on a business owner during a storm.6
The Law Court's decision joins a small number of jurisdictions that impose a
duty on business owners to clear ice and snow accumulation during a storm.7 The
majority of jurisdictions have adopted the "storm in progress" doctrine, which
provides that a business owner "is afforded a reasonable time after the cessation of
the storm or temperature fluctuations ... to correct the situation."'8 The jurisdic-
tions that adopt this doctrine do so on the premise that requiring a business owner
to clear precipitation as it is falling is unreasonable, inexpedient, impractical, and
has the potential of erroneously turning the business owner into an insurer of invi-
tee safety.9
This Note focuses on the disparity between the duty imposed on business
owners in Maine and the duty placed on business owners in the jurisdictions that
adopt the "storm in progress" doctrine. The question is: In declining to adopt the"storm in progress" doctrine, has the Law Court adopted a rule that forces business
owners to insure the safety of their invitees during a winter storm? It is clear from
1. 2001 ME 37, 767 A.2d 310.
2. Id. 16, 767 A.2d at 315.
3. Id. 2,767 A.2d at 312.
4. Id. 4, 767 A.2d at 312-13.
5. Id. 16, 767 A.2d at 315.
6. Id. 15, 767 A.2d at 315.
7. Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co., 112 F2d 577, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Quinlivan v. Great At. &
Pac. Tea Co., 235 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Mich. 1975).
8. Olejniczak v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 998 F. Supp. 274, 280 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
9. E.g., Munsill v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 2d 214, 220-21 (D.R.I. 1998).
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the Budzko opinion that the Law Court based its decision in part on the number of
invitees that traversed the steps of One City Center on February 27, 1995.10 Sev-
eral other jurisdictions have held that it is improper to place an enhanced duty on a
business owner solely because of his or her status as a business owner--duties are
determined based on the status of the plaintiff, whether trespasser, licensee, or
invitee.1 1 Therefore, two other questions are raised: (1) did the Law Court imper-
missibly base One City Center's duty on its status as a large business owner; and
(2) what ramifications result from the Budzko decision?
In order to address these questions, this Note first examines the general duty
of care a business owner owes to a business invitee. Part II.A first addresses the
general duty of care in the states that have adopted the "storm in progress" doc-
trine, namely, Rhode Island, West Virginia, Virginia, New York, Connecticut, Min-
nesota, Iowa, and Pennsylvania. 12 Part II.A then addresses the general duty of
care in Massachusetts and Ohio, which are states that have adopted the "natural
accumulation rule." 13 This rule provides that absent a defect, a business owner
has no duty to remove the natural accumulation of ice or snow, during or after a
storm.14 Finally, Part II.A addresses the general duty of care in Michigan, the
District of Columbia, and Maine, which are states that have carved out unique
duties regarding the duty of care to clear snow and ice. 15 In Part II.B, this Note
examines how the preceding states apply their general duties of care to the unique
situation of a business owner's duty to clear ice and snow as it is accumulating.
Finally, this Note takes an in-depth look at Maine, including the case law preced-
ing Budzko, the decision itself, and an analysis of the questions raised by the deci-
sion.
II. GENERAL DUTIES OF CARE AND THEIR APPLICATION TO
ICE AND SNOW/SLIP AND FALL CASES
A. Defining the General Duty of Care Owed by a
Business Owner to a Business Invitee
Duties of care for business owners and how those duties are interpreted vary
from state to state. Each jurisdiction uses essentially the same principles: (1) duty
is fashioned on the status of the plaintiff; 16 (2) reasonable or ordinary care is ex-
10. Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 2001 ME 37,1 16, 767 A.2d 310, 315.
11. Walker v. Mem'l Hosp., 45 S.E.2d 898, 899, 902 (Va. 1948); Sinert v. Olympia & York
Dev. Co., 664 A.2d 791, 793 (Conn. App. 1995).
12. Munsill v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 221; Olejniczak v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 998 F. Supp. at 280; Dom v. Manzi, No. CV 930132099S, 1995 WL 243414, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 1995); Reuter v. Iowa Trust & Sav. Bank, 57 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Iowa 1953);
Mattson v. St. Luke's Hosp. of St. Paul, 89 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Minn. 1958); Goodman v. Corn
Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 200A. 642,643 (Pa. 1938); Walker v. Mem'l Hosp., 45 S.E.2d at
902; Phillips v. SuperAmerica Group, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 504, 506-07 (N.D. W. Va. 1994).
13. Athas v. United States, 904 F.2d 79, 81 (1st Cir. 1990); Dailey v. Mayo Family Ltd.
P'ship, 684 N.E.2d 746, 748-49 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
14. Munsill v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 221.
15. Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co., Inc., 112 F.2d 577, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Budzko v. One City
Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 2001 ME 37, 16, 767 A.2d 310, 315; Quinlivan v. Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 235 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Mich. 1975).
16. See cases cited infra note 24.
2003]
pected in keeping premises reasonably safe; 17 (3) business owners are not insurers
of safety; 18 and (4) foreseeability, both in terms of the invitor and invitee's ability
to foresee, is a factor when determining duty.19 Differences in how the above
principles are weighed can have a significant impact on whether or not a state
chooses to adopt the "storm in progress" doctrine or chooses to adopt a different
rule. For example, in New York, "a landowner [has] a duty to business invitees to
keep [the] premises in a reasonably safe condition." 20 Furthermore, in ice and
snow/slip and fall cases, "the plaintiff must.., show that the defendant had actual
or constructive notice of the.., condition" and "thereafter failed to use reasonable
care to remedy [it]." 2 1 A landowner in Connecticut owes virtually the same duty
to business invitees. 22 What Connecticut also makes clear is that a landowner's
duty of care is determined by the status of the entrant, i.e., trespasser, licensee, or
invitee, and not whether the landowner maintains the property for commercial or
private use.23 This is a common thread among a number of jurisdictions-when
deciding what duty to impose, the duty is applied based on the status of the plain-
tiff, not whether the landowner uses the premises for business purposes.24 An-
other common thread among the jurisdictions is the principle that a landowner is
not an insurer of an invitee's safety.25 This is generally interpreted to mean that
unreasonable efforts are not expected of the landowner and that an invitee has no
right to expect absolute safety.26
17. See cases cited infra notes 27, 30.
18. See cases cited infra note 25.
19. See cases cited infra notes 29, 32.
20. Olejniczak v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 998 F. Supp. 274, 280 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
21. Id. at 277-78. In order to prove constructive notice, the plaintiff must show that the
condition existed for such a period of time prior to the accident that the defendant should have
discovered and remedied it. Id. at 278. This "snow and ice/slip and fall" burden is in addition to
the plaintiff's normal burden of showing: (1) the existence of a duty on the defendant's part; (2)
a breach; and (3) an injury suffered as a result of that breach. Id. at 277.
22. Sinert v. Olympia & York Dev. Co., 664 A.2d 791, 794 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) ("Con-
necticut law requires a landowner to use reasonable care to maintain the premises in a reason-
ably safe condition."). Minnesota law is essentially the same. Mattson v. St. Luke's Hosp. of St.
Paul, 89 N.W.2d 743,745 (Minn. 1958) (stating that the "defendant... was under an affirmative
duty to exercise reasonable care in inspecting and maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe
condition").
23. Sinert v. Olympia & York Dev. Co., 664 A.2d at 793. The Connecticut Superior Court
further resolvy the issue by i ating that "the fact that the defendant is a business owner cannot
be considered an unusual circumstance imposing a duty to remove snow and ice during a storm
in progress." Dom v. Manzi, No. CV 930132099S, 1995 WL 243414, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 20, 1995).
24. See, e.g., Reuter v. Iowa Trust & Say. Bank, 57 N.W.2d 225,226 (Iowa 1953) (stating that
a landlord, in this case a business landlord, will be treated as a general owner of land, and that
his or her duty is based upon the plaintiff's invitation or permission to use the premises); Walker
v. Mem'l Hosp., 45 S.E.2d 898, 899,902 (Va. 1948) (making no distinction between a "business
establishment, landlord, carrier, or other inviter" and imposing the duty chosen because "as a
visitor [the plaintiff] occupied the legal status of an invitee").
25. E.g., Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co., 112 F.2d 577, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Quinlivan v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 235 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Mich. 1975); Walker v. Mem'I Hosp., 45 S.E.2d at
907.
26. See, e.g., Walker v. Mem'l Hosp., 45 S.E.2d at 903.
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In Rhode Island, a jurisdiction that applies the "storm in progress" doctrine, a
business owner is bound only to use "ordinary care and diligence to keep the pre-
mises in a safe condition for the access of persons who come thereon by his invita-
tion, express or implied, for the transaction of business, or for any other purpose
beneficial to him."'27 In determining whether or not a duty exists in a particular
situation, Rhode Island considers factors such as the "relationship of the parties,
the scope and burden of the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, public
policy considerations, and notions of fairness."'28 While foreseeability of the harm
to the plaintiff is key to determining whether or not there is a duty, foreseeability,
in and of itself, does not give rise to that duty.2 9
Similarly, in West Virginia, a landowner, business or otherwise, "owes to an
invitee the duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping and maintaining his premises
in a reasonably safe condition."'30 An important limitation on this duty is the dis-
tinction West Virginia places on dangers that are "obvious, reasonably apparent, or
as well known to the person injured as they are to the owner or occupant. '31 The
risk of dangers that are known and obvious, or would be observed by the invitee if
he or she exercised ordinary care, is a risk that the invitee assumes. 32
The other jurisdictions that have adopted the "storm in progress" doctrine hold
business owners to essentially the same duty as do the above jurisdictions.33 In
Massachusetts, which has adopted the "natural accumulation" rule, 34 the general
duty imposed requires that "a landowner must maintain his property 'in a reason-
ably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of
injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk."' 35
In Michigan, where exactly the opposite approach is taken and the "natural accu-
mulation" rule has been expressly rejected (and the "storm in progress" doctrine
implicitly rejected), 36 the duty imposed is such that invitors must maintain the
27. De Mello v. St. Thomas the Apostle Church Corp. of Warren, 165 A.2d 500, 502 (R.I.
1960).
28. Kenney Mfg. Co. v. Starkweather & Shepley, Inc., 643 A.2d 203, 206 (R.I. 1994).
29. Munsill v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 2d 214, 220 (D.R.I. 1998).
30. Phillips v. SuperAmerica Group, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 504, 505 (N.D. W. Va. 1994).
31. Burdette v. Burdette, 127 S.E.2d 249, 252 (W. Va. 1962) (internal quotation omitted).
32. Phillips v. SuperAmerica Group, Inc., 852 F. Supp. at 505.
33. Reuter v. Iowa Trust & Sav. Bank, 57 N.W.2d 225, 226 (Iowa 1953) (holding that the
defendant owed "a duty of reasonable care to keep the property in a reasonably safe condition");
Goodman v. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 200 A. 642, 643 (Pa. 1938) (stating that the
plaintiff-invitee was to maintain the stairway in a reasonably safe condition); Walker v. Mem'l
Hosp., 45 S.E.2d 898, 899 (Va. 1948) (holding that the defendant owed the plaintiff "the duty to
exercise ordinary care to have its premises in a reasonably safe condition" and that "it was
incumbent upon the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care for her own safety").
34. The "natural accumulation" rule states that there must be some other causal defect be-
sides the natural accumulation of water, ice, or snow in order to establish negligence. Athas v.
United States, 904 F.2d 79, 81 (1st Cir. 1990).
35. Id. (quoting Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 52 (Mass. 1973)).
36. Quinlivan v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 235 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Mich. 1975). Instead,
Michigan offers the following rule:
[T]he invitor has a duty to exercise reasonable care to diminish the hazards of ice and
snow accumulation .... As [the general duty of care imposed on a landowner] per-
tains to ice and snow accumulations, it will require that reasonable measures be taken
within a reasonable time after an accumulation of ice and snow to diminish the hazard
of injury to the invitee.
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property in a reasonably safe condition and must exercise due care to prevent and
obviate the existence of a condition, be it known or reasonably known, that might
result in injury. 37
The District of Columbia takes a similar approach to that taken by Michi-
gan. 38 The District of Columbia imposes a general duty on landowners for the
benefit of invitees. This duty requires landowners to exercise ordinary care so that
the property will be reasonably safe. After notice of conditions, whether perma-
nent or temporary, that make the property dangerous to invitees, the landowner
must take ordinary care to free the property from those conditions. 39
Finally, Maine, a jurisdiction that has explicitly rejected the "storm in progress"
doctrine and in doing so implicitly rejected the "natural accumulation" rule,40 im-
poses a general duty of care on the landowner to exercise "reasonable care in pro-
viding reasonably safe premises.., when it knows or should have known of a risk
to customers on its premises. '4 1 Additionally, a business owner who is aware of
the existence of a potentially dangerous recurrent condition may not ignore that
knowledge and must reasonably respond to "the foreseeable danger of the likeli-
hood of a recurrence of the condition." 42
B. Interpreting and Applying the General Duty of Care to Ice and Snow Removal
1. The "Storm in Progress" Doctrine
The majority of the jurisdictions that have considered what duty a business
owner owes to an invitee to clear accumulating ice and snow have adopted the"storm in progress" doctrine-affording a business owner a reasonable time after
the cessation of a storm or temperature fluctuations to remedy the situation. 43 There
are two principle reasons behind the adoption of the "storm in progress" doctrine.
The first is that requiring business owners to clear ice and snow before a storm has
ceased would improperly make them insurers of their invitees' safety.44 It is a
well-settled principle that although a business owner generally owes a reasonable
duty of care to keep property reasonably safe, he or she is not an insurer.45 In other
37. Id. at 735.
38. See Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co., 112 F.2d 577, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
39. Id.
40. Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 2001 ME 37, 13, 767 A.2d 310, 314 n.3.
However, Maine may not extend the duty placed on landowners as far as Michigan and the
District of Columbia do. See id. 13, 767 A.2d at 314 n.2 (holding open the possibility that
there may be circumstances where a business owner might not have to remove snow as it accu-
mulates).
41. Currier v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 680 A.2d 453, 455-56 (Me. 1996) (internal quotation omit-
ted).
42. Dumont v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 664 A.2d 846, 849 (Me. 1995).
43. Olejniczak v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 998 F. Supp. 274, 280 (W.D.N.Y. 1998);
Phillips v. SuperAmerica Group, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 504, 506 (N.D. W. Va. 1994); Dorn v. Manzi,
No. CV 930132099S, 1995 WL 243414, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 1995); Reuter v. Iowa
Trust & Sav. Bank, 57 N.W.2d 225,227 (Iowa 1953); Mattson v. St. Luke's Hosp. of St. Paul, 89
N.W.2d 743, 745 (Minn. 1958); Goodman v. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 200 A. 642,
643 (Pa. 1938); Walker v. Mem'l Hosp., 45 S.E.2d 898, 902 (Va. 1948).
44. E.g., Mattson v. St. Luke's Hosp. of St. Paul, 89 N.W.2d at 746-47 ("Any rule to the
contrary would... erroneously constitute it an insurer of the safety of invitees.").
45. E.g., Reuter v. Iowa Trust & Sav. Bank, 57 N.W.2d at 226.
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words, standards of care should not be formulated so as to require that the business
owner insure that the invitee is safe on the property at all times. The Supreme
Court of Iowa explained that keeping property safe is quite different from taking
reasonable steps to keep property safe and that business owners are only required
to do the latter.4 6
The second principle reason for adopting the "storm in progress" doctrine is
that requiring a business owner to remove snow or ice before a storm has ended
would hold him or her to a standard of care that is not reasonable or ordinary.47 In
Phillips v. SuperAmerica Group, Inc.,48 the plaintiff slipped and fell while pur-
chasing gasoline at the defendant's gasoline station during a severe snowstorm. 49
In response to the plaintiff's argument that the defendant had a duty to keep its
premises free from snow and ice,50 the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of West Virginia, applying existing West Virginia and Virginia com-
mon law,5 1 held that the changing weather conditions due to the storm rendered it
"inexpedient and impractical" to take action before the cessation of the storm, and
that ordinary care did not require it.52
In Walker v. Memorial Hospital,5 3 the plaintiff, Mrs. Walker, fell down the
steps of the defendant hospital as she was leaving after visiting her husband. 54
Freezing rain had been falling fairly continuously for about two hours previous to
her fall. 55 Mrs. Walker had been the second person to fall on the steps that night
and the hospital had made no efforts, either through a sign or via the employee
seated at the desk near the doors, to notify patrons that the conditions were icy on
the steps.5 6 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that even if the hospital had been
able to remove all of the ice from its premises, the effect of the removal would
merely have reduced the distance Mrs. Walker would have had to walk on a slip-
pery surface by less than twenty feet because in order to get to her destination she
had to traverse on the icy city sidewalks.57 In adopting the "storm in progress"
doctrine, the court stated that the general controlling principle is that ordinary care
does not require taking action before the end of the storm; the changing conditions
would render it "inexpedient and impractical" to do so. 58 In the court's view, the
hazardous condition was caused solely by the "usual and natural action of the
elements" and every pedestrian who ventures out into those conditions knows that
there is a risk that he or she may fall.5 9 It would be unreasonable, in the eyes of the
46. Id. at 226-27.
47. E.g., Walker v. Mem'l Hosp., 45 S.E.2d at 902; Phillips v. SuperAmerica Group, Inc., 852
F. Supp. at 506.
48. 852 F Supp. 504 (N.D.W. Va. 1994).
49. Id. at 504.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 505-06. Virginia law was used because no state court in West Virginia has ad-
dressed this specific issue as yet.
52. Id. at 506.
53. 45 S.E.2d 898 (Va. 1948).
54. Id. at 899.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 900.
57. Id. at 902.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 907.
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court, to require a business owner to repeatedly enter into the storm and risk injury
to him or herself, just to relieve the invitee of that risk.60
In Munsill v. United States,6 1 the plaintiff fell outside of a post office during a
snowstorm.62 The United States District Court in Rhode Island concluded that
given the opportunity, the Rhode Island Supreme Court would adopt the "storm in
progress" doctrine,6 3 and stated that, "[sihoveling against a snowstorm is like shov-
eling sand against the tide .... Thus, the reasonable rule is that an occupier of
business premises has until the end of a snowstorm to remove accumulations of
snow and ice." 64 Finally, in Mattson v. St. Luke's Hospital of St. Paul,6 5 the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota held that "[rieasonable care for the safety of an invitee
does not require an inviter to engage in an unending and impractical, if not useless,
contest with the uncontrollable forces of nature while a storm is in progress."'66
The court stated that these weather conditions were "normal hazards of life" over
which the defendant had no control and which affected not only the defendant's
property, but all the other exposed property in the city.67
In applying the "storm in progress" doctrine, several courts have had to ad-
dress the issue of "unusual circumstances." These courts have adopted the "storm
in progress" doctrine with the caveat that business owners have until a reasonable
time after the cessation of a storm to clear the storm's effects absent unusual cir-
cumstances.6 8 Although none of the case law has specified what unusual circum-
stances might entail, the case law does shed light on what they do not entail. For
example, in Connecticut, taking into consideration the location of the premises,
the use of the premises, the day of the week, and the time of the day in determining
liability is improper because those factors take into consideration the defendant's
status as an owner of a business establishment. 69 Therefore, these factors do not
constitute unusual circumstances. In Iowa, heavy snowfall and snow packed steps
are not unusual circumstances. 70 Nor are those unusual circumstances in Minne-
sota. 7 1 Unusual circumstances did not exist in any of the cases analyzed here,
even though injuries occurred at hospitals where one might assume that people
60. Id.
61. 14 F. Supp. 2d 214 (D.R.I. 1998).
62. Id. at 216.
63. Id. at 221. No state court in Rhode Island has addressed the issue as yet.
64. Id. at 221-22.
65. 89 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. 1958).
66. Id. at 746.
67. Id. A New York court summed up the matter well:
The presence of snow or ice upon exposed places.., is an accident of the hour, and no
ordinary diligence could, during the prevalence of a storm, wholly remove its effects
from the places exposed to its action, so as to prevent accidents to heedless and inat-tentive [invitees]. A[n] [invitee] has no right to assume that the effects of a continu-
ous storm of snow, sleet, rain or hail will be immediately and effectually removed
from the exposed [area] ....
Palmer v. Penn. Co., 18 N.E. 859, 861 (N.Y. 1888).
68. Sinert v. Olympia & York Dev. Co., 664 A.2d 791, 793 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995); Reuter v.
Iowa Trust & Sav. Bank, 57 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Iowa 1953); Mattson v. St. Luke's Hosp. of St.Paul, 89 N.W.2d at 745; Walker v. Mem'l Hosp., 45 S.E.2d 898, 902 (Va. 1948).
69. Sinert v. Olympia & York Dev. Co., 664 A.2d at 793.
70. See Reuter v. Iowa Trust & Say. Bank, 57 N.W.2d at 226.71. See Mattson v. St. Luke's Hosp. of St. Paul, 89 N.W.2d at 746.
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who are already injured may be traveling,7 2 fast food restaurants where one might
expect a high traffic flow,7 3 post offices where one might expect the same,74 and
gasoline stations on Christmas Eve, one of the busiest travel days of the year.75
The "storm in progress" doctrine is applied in the above jurisdictions in accor-
dance with the theory that requiring business owners to clear accumulation as it is
falling requires business owners to insure their invitees' safety and does not com-
port with a reasonable standard of care. Requiring landowners to clear ice and
snow as it falls is "inexpedient and impracticable" and is not a reasonable reaction
to a usual and natural action of the elements that pedestrians knowingly encounter
whenever they step outside. Therefore, while the door remains open to the argu-
ment that unusual circumstances justify an exception to the rule, snowfall in heavily
traveled business areas will not constitute unusual circumstances.
2. The "Natural Accumulation" Rule
Taking an even stricter approach than the majority of jurisdictions do, Massa-
chusetts applies the "natural accumulation" rule when deciding cases involving a
business owner's duty to clear ice and snow resulting from the natural accumula-
tion of precipitation. 76 Under this rule, there must be some defect other than the
natural accumulation of ice and snow in order to hold the defendant liable. 77 One
of the reasons for this rule is that
in this climate [one with stormy winters] ... a number of conditions might exist
which within a very short time could cause the formation of ice.., without fault
of the owner and without reasonable opportunity on his part to remove it or to
warn against it or even to ascertain its presence. 78
If, however, the ice and/or snow remains on the property for an extended period of
time, human activity can create conditions that would render the accumulation
unnaturally hazardous. 79 In these types of situations, the business owner may be
found negligent. 80
Ohio also follows the "natural accumulation" rule. 81 In a case where the plain-
tiff slipped and fell on an accumulation of ice in the parking lot of a retail estab-
*72. Id.; Walker v. Mem'l Hosp., 45 S.E.2d at 899.
73. Dor v. Manzi, No. CV 930132099S, 1995 WL 243414, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20,
1995).
74. Munsill v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 2d 214, 216 (D.R.I. 1998).
75. Phillips v. SuperAmerica Group, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 504, 504 (N.D.W. Va. 1994).
76. Athas v. United States, 904 F.2d 79, 81 (1st Cir. 1990).
77. Id.
78. Collins v. Collins, 16 N.E.2d 665, 665 (Mass. 1938).
79. Phipps v. Aptuxet Post #5988 V.F.W. Bldg. Ass'n, 389 N.E.2d 1042,1043 (Mass. App. Ct.
1979); Jakobsen v. Mass. Port Auth., 520 F.2d 810, 817 (1st Cir. 1975). In Phipps, cars that had
traveled over snow left in the parking lot created icy ruts that were the cause of the plaintiff's
fall. Phipps v. Aptuxet Post #5988 V.F.W. Bldg. Ass'n, 389 N.E.2d at 1042. The defendant was
found liable due to the fact that the dangerous condition was no longer solely the result of natural
accumulation. Id. at 1043. In Jakobsen, the plodding from a constant stream of people outside
the entrance to an air terminal transformed a natural accumulation of precipitation into a slick
condition for which the defendant was found liable. Jakobsen v. Mass. Port Auth., 520 F.2d at
817.
80. See cases cited supra note 79.
81. Dailey v. Mayo Family Ltd. P'ship, 684 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
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lishment, the Court of Appeals of Ohio stated, "[t]he law is clear in Ohio that an
owner of land ordinarily owes no duty to business invitees to remove natural accu-
mulations of ice and snow ... or to warn the invitee of the dangers associated
therewith." 82 The Ohio court used similar reasoning to that used in Massachu-
setts: it is often impossible and ordinarily impracticable to hold that liability exists
from the actions of elements in a climate where winter brings frequent snowstorms
and sudden and extreme changes in temperature and conditions. 83 Therefore, as
long as the accumulation of ice and snow is in all respects natural, no liability
exists.84 However, the longer the accumulation stays on the premises, the greater
the likelihood that some man-made condition will alter its natural state and create
the opportunity for liability on the part of the business owner. The major differ-
ence between this rule and the "storm in progress" doctrine is that under this theory,
snow and ice may remain untouched on a property indefinitely and as long as it
remains in its natural condition, someone who falls and injures themselves will not
have a cause of action. In a "storm in progress" jurisdiction, the business owner
must clear the accumulation within a reasonable time after the storm has ceased in
order to avoid liability.
3. Michigan and the District of Columbia's Standard
Michigan approaches this matter altogether differently. In Quinlivan v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,85 the plaintiff parked his automobile in the parking lot
of the defendant grocery store and after leaving his automobile he fell in the snow-
covered, icy lot.86 Snow had not fallen for several days.87 The Supreme Court of
Michigan started its analysis by defining the general duty of care that an invitor
owes an invitee.88 Following a discussion of the history of slip and fall cases in
Michigan, the court noted that although the "thrust" of Michigan case law supports
the application of the "natural accumulation" rule, none of the cases reconcile the
rule with the rigorous duty owed to invitees. 89 The court bypassed any discussion
of the "storm in progress" doctrine and resolved the case with the rule that the
invitor must take "reasonable measures... within a reasonable time after an accu-
mulation of ice or snow to diminish the hazard of injury to the invitee." 90 The
court did not answer the question of how much precipitation must accumulate
before the invitor must take action to diminish any risk to the invitee.
Ten years later in Lundy v. Groty,9 1 the Court of Appeals of Michigan demon-
strated how seriously it viewed the invitor's duty to an invitee. Lundy, a seventy-
82. d. at 746, 748.
83. Id. at 749.
84. Id.
85. 235 N.W.2d 732 (Mich. 1975).
86. Id. at 733.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 735. The general duty as stated is:
"As invitor the defendant owed the duty to its customers and patrons, including the
plaintiff, of maintaining its premises in a reasonably safe condition and of exercising
due care to prevent and to obviate the existence of a situation, known to it or that
should have been known, that might result in injury."
Id. (quoting Blakeley v. White Star Line, 118 N.W. 482, 483 (Mich. 1908)).
89. Quinlivan v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 235 N.W.2d at 737-38.
90. Id. at 740.
91. 367 N.W.2d 448 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
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year-old woman, worked for the defendant as housekeeper and a babysitter.92 A
snowstorm had started the night before the plaintiff's injury and snow was still
falling when the plaintiff arrived at the defendant's house at noon the next day.9 3
The defendant had not shoveled or salted her driveway, and when the plaintiff
stepped out of her car she slipped and fell.9 4 The trial court examined the rule set
out in Quinlivan and held that the defendant was not liable to remove snow as it
was falling.9 5 The Court of Appeals of Michigan reversed, holding that the trial
court's approach (essentially the "storm in progress" doctrine) was not compatible
with existing Michigan law.96 The court considered the fact that the defendant
knew that the snow was falling on her property and would create a dangerous
situation for the plaintiff-therefore, the applicable duty of care required the de-
fendant "to shovel, salt, sand or otherwise remove the snow." 97 The fact that
Michigan imposed a duty on a private homeowner who was expecting a single
invitee is evidence that Michigan bases its duty of care solely on the status of the
plaintiff, and not on whether the defendant is a business owner expecting a high
volume of invitees.
The approach taken in the District of Columbia is similar to that taken in
Michigan. In Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co.,98 the plaintiff was injured in the drive-
way of an apartment house.99 The plaintiff was a guest of one of the tenants and
was leaving the building to take a cab.100 The weather was cold and rainy and the
driveway was slippery from ice forming as the rain fell. 10 1 Nothing had been
spread on the steps or the driveway to counter any of the risk caused by the ice. 10 2
The trial court relied on a New York case that held that the failure to remove ice
during a storm or immediately after the storm's abatement was not actionable neg-
ligence and entered judgment not withstanding the verdict for the defendant. 103
The D.C. Circuit reversed, stating that a landlord owed a duty to invitees to exer-
cise ordinary care in keeping the premises free from permanent or temporary risks
that are known to the landlord. 104 In this case the landlord knew of the conditions
and had sanded four times prior to the plaintiff's fall.1 05 However, the last sand-
ing, four hours before the plaintiff fell, had been washed away by the time the
plaintiff was leaving the building. 106 The D.C. Circuit held that the question of
92. Id. at 449.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 449-50.
97. Id. at 450. The court cited Torma v. Montgomery Ward & Co. and the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS as sources that defined the general duty of care in Michigan that invitors owe
to invitees. Id. at 449. What the court seemingly ignored, however, is that the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS does not impose a duty on the invitor if the danger is obvious to the invitee.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965). Here, the danger certainly seems to be one that
would be obvious to the plaintiff. See Lundy v. Groty, 367 N.W.2d at 449.
98. 112F.2d577 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
99. Id. at 578.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 579.
105, Id.
106. Id.
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whether or not the defendant had acted reasonably was a question for the jury and
reinstated the original jury verdict. 107
Both the courts in Michigan and in the District of Columbia stated that they
were not imposing a duty that turned the invitor into a guarantor of safety or an
insurer of invitees. 10 8 The D.C. Circuit also stated that if spreading sand or some
other preventative substance would have been impossible or useless, then it would
not have been reasonable to expect the defendant to do so. 109 In addition, if spread-
ing sand every two or three hours would have provided reasonable safety, then the
defendant had satisfied its burden. 110 However, that was a question left for the
jury, leaving open the possibility that "reasonable" could be interpreted as requir-
ing that the invitor spread sand at more frequent time intervals. 111 The approach
taken in these two jurisdictions reflects the policy that every invitee, regardless of
at what point during the storm they enter the defendant's property, should be able
to benefit from the results of the invitor having taken reasonable care to provide
for their safety.
C. Maine's Treatment of Ice and Snow/Slip and Fall Cases
In 1917, the Law Court first addressed the duty owed to a business invitee in
Davis v. Waterville, Fairfield & Oakland Street Railway Co.11 2 The plaintiff had
slipped and fallen as she was alighting from the defendant's car.113 The Law
Court held that:
[Tihe railroad company should not be held responsible, under ordinary circum-
stances, for the existence of snow or ice upon the steps accumulating through
natural causes, during the journey, until it has had a reasonably sufficient time
and opportunity, consistently with its duty to transport its passengers, to remove
such accumulations. To require the immediate and continuous removal of all
snow from the steps during the journey would be impracticable. 114
The Law Court declined to disrupt the jury's verdict for the plaintiff. 115 In doing
so, the Law Court stated that based on the facts of the case, the jury could have
discredited the conductor's testimony that he had cleared the steps only twenty
minutes before the accident. 116
The Law Court did not mention the "storm in progress" doctrine until 1972.
In Isaacson v. Husson College,117 Lawrence Isaacson was a resident of Husson
107. Id. at 579-80.
108. Id. at 579; Quinlivan v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 235 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Mich. 1975).
109. Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co., 112 F.2d at 579.
110. Id.
111. Id. The Pessagno case has not been without critique. In Walker v. Memorial Hospital,
the Supreme Court of Virginia emphasized that in all of the case law that the Pessagno court
relied on in making its decision, the slippery conditions were due to causes which existed before
the storms began (i.e. failure to remove ice that had existed long before snow had begun to fall).
Walker v. Mem'l Hosp., 45 S.E.2d 898,903 (Va. 1948). Therefore, the cases cited by the Pessagno
court stood only for the principle that a property owner is allowed a reasonable time after a
storm has ended to take action. Id.
112. 117 Me. 32, 102A. 374 (1917).
113. Id. at 375.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 375-76.
116. Id.
117. 297A.2d98 (Me. 1972).
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College when, on February 27, 1969, as he was returning from the dining com-
mons to his dorm room, he slipped and fell on an icy patch on the walkway pro-
vided by the college. 118 Isaacson sustained personal injuries and sued Husson
College for compensatory damages. 119 Husson College rested its case without
presenting any evidence and made a motion for a directed verdict, which was
granted. 120 The trial court had two underlying reasons for granting Husson
College's motion for a directed verdict:
(1) there was no duty under the law of Maine resting upon the defendant towards
the plaintiff to remove a natural accumulation of ice and snow under any circum-
stances, and (2), even if there were such a duty, the plaintiff, by undertaking, in
the face of the obvious hazard of lack of illumination, to walk the pathway in a
shuffling manner though wearing ripple-sole shoes, manifested such an aware-
ness of latent potential dangers due to weather conditions that ... he would be
barred from recovery of any damages for his resultant injury .... 121
The Law Court disagreed with the trial court's reasoning and reversed the trial
court's decision. 12 2 The Law Court stated that Isaacson's relationship with the
defendant was as a business visitor or invitee and that the defendant owed him, as
a business invitee, the "positive duty of exercising reasonable care to provide him
with walkways which he was invited to use, or which he would be reasonably
expected to use, which were reasonably safe for his use." 12 3 The Law Court also
stated that, "[e]ven though the owner or occupier of land does not insure safety to
business invitees, nevertheless he is under legal obligation to use ordinary care to
ensure that the premises are reasonably safe for invitees in the light of the totality
of the existing circumstances." '124 The Law Court recognized that it had previ-
ously held that an owner or occupier of land had no duty to remove natural accu-
mulations of ice and snow for people passing by or in the landlord-tenant relation-
ship, 12 5 however it declined to extend that doctrine to the business invitee situa-
tion. 126
The Law Court then explained that the business invitee had a right to assume
that the premises were reasonably safe for his use.127 "The mere fact that snow
and ice conditions are prevalent" during Maine winters does not, by itself, excuse
the landowner from exercising the duty owed to the invitee. 128 Although the plaintiff
must at all times exercise ordinary care for his own safety, the Law Court ex-
plained that the plaintiff had the right to expect that the defendant's employees
would exercise reasonable care in inspecting the campus and in taking such cor-
rective measure or giving such warning as may be reasonably necessary for the
plaintiff's protection. 129
118. Id. at 100.
119. Id. at 100-01.
120. Id. at 101.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 103.
124. Id.
125. Id. The Law Court was referring to its decisions in Ouellette v. Miller, 134 Me. 162, 183
A. 341 (1936) and Rosenburg v. Chapman Nat'l Bank, 126 Me. 403, 139 A. 82 (1927).
126. Isaacson v. Husson Coll., 297 A.2d at 103.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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The Law Court then explicitly reserved the issue of what would constitute
reasonable care during a storm in progress and recognized that the general rule is
that the business owner has a reasonable time after the storm has abated before
remedying the condition. 13 0 In Isaacson's case, the storm had abated the after-
noon preceding the day of the accident. 131 Although there was evidence that the
ice patch may have been caused by the accumulation of water from thawed snow
near the walkway, and the subsequent freezing of such water, the Law Court stated
that this thawing/freezing process is such an integral part of Maine winters that
landowners should know that falls on ice are readily foreseeable unless reasonable
steps are taken to inspect the areas or otherwise protect invitees from harm. 132
Finally, the Law Court rejected the doctrine that provides that there is no obli-
gation to protect the invitee from known or obvious dangers. 133 Instead, the Law
Court explained that there are some cases in which the landowner can anticipate
that the dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the invitee regardless of
its obvious danger. 134 In these cases the landowner will not be relieved of the duty
of reasonable care and may be required to warn the invitee or take other steps to
protect him or her from the obvious danger. 135 The Law Court concluded that the
130. Id. at 103-04. The Law Court stated:
We need not determine in the instant case what steps reasonable care would have
required the corporate defendant to take while the storm was in progress. This was
not the freezing rain or sleetstorm during which, under the general rule, the invitor is
not required to remove the freezing precipitation as it falls, but is only duty bound to
take appropriate corrective action within a reasonable time after the storm has abated.
Id.
131. Id. at 104.
132. Id.
133. Id. This doctrine is presented in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 343, 343A(1)
(1965). Section 343 states:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a
condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to pro-
tect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
Section 343A(1) states that, "[a] possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm
caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to
them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness."
134. Isaacson v. Husson Coll., 297 A.2d at 105. This position is summarized in comment f of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965). Comment f reads:
There are, however, cases in which the possessor of land can and should anticipate
that the dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the invitee notwithstanding
its known or obvious danger. In such cases the possessor is not relieved of the duty of
reasonable care which he owes to the invitee for his protection. This duty may re-
quire him to warn the invitee, or to take other reasonable steps to protect him, against
the known or obvious condition or activity, if the possessor has reason to expect that
the invitee will nevertheless suffer physical harm.
Examples include times when it is reasonable to expect that the invitee's attention may be dis-
tracted or when it is reasonable to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the danger
because for a reasonable person in his or her position the advantages would outweigh the risk.
Id.
135. Isaacson v. Husson Coll., 297 A.2d at 105.
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discharge of the landowner's duty carries with it the implication that the land-
owner "shall have reasonable notice of the need for, and a reasonable opportunity
to take, corrective [measures] for the safety of his invitees. ' '136 Proving reason-
able notice and reasonable opportunity is the plaintiff's burden, and Isaacson satis-
fied that burden. 137
Two other ice and snow/slip and fall cases preceded Budzko. In 1998, the Law
Court decided Denman v. Peoples Heritage Bank Inc.,138 and held that the defen-
dants did not owe a duty to the plaintiff because they were not in possession of the
sidewalk on which she fell. 139 In light of the fact that the defendants owed no duty
to the plaintiff, the Law Court did not decide what the appropriate degree of care
would have been had there been a duty. 140
In the second case, Mixer v. Tarratine Market,14 1 the plaintiff fell outside the
entry door to the defendant's market.142 It had been snowing for several hours
before her fall and there was conflicting evidence regarding whether steps had
been taken to clear any of the snow. 143 The Law Court only addressed whether the
trial court erred in (1) not giving the plaintiff's requested jury instructions; and in
(2) admitting evidence of the plaintiff's balance problems, and did not actually
reach the issue raised in Budzko. 144 The trial court's jury instructions charged the
jury in general terms regarding the duty of a landowner in keeping his or her pre-
mises reasonably safe but did not address any specific issues related to the removal
of snow and ice. 14 5 The Law Court affirmed the trial court's instructions and the
136. Id.
137. Id. at 105-06.
138. 1998 ME 12, 704A.2d 411.
139. ld. 7 7, 9, 704 A.2d at 414, 415. Peoples Heritage Bank was required under a Portland
city ordinance to maintain the public sidewalk in front of the bank. Id. 2, 704 A.2d at 413. It
entered into a contract with Fox Enterprises to clear the ice and snow as required by the ordi-
nance. Id. The ordinance required that "in the business-pedestrian district, the owner, manager
or any person having responsibility for any building or lot of land which abuts any street where
there is a sidewalk shall remove snow from the entire sidewalk within twelve (12) hours after
snow has ceased to fall." Id. n. 1 (quoting Portland, Me, Code of Ordinances § 25-173 (1993)).
The ordinance further required that:
In the business-pedestrian district, whenever the sidewalk or any part thereof adjoin-
ing any building or lot of land on any street shall be encumbered with ice for six (6)
hours or more during the daytime, it shall be the duty of the owner and any person
having the responsibility for such building or lot to cause such sidewalk to be made
safe and convenient by removing the ice therefrom or by covering the same with sand
or some other suitable substance.
Id. n. I (quoting Portland, Me, Code of Ordinances § 25-174 (1993)). Thus, the duty imposed by
the City of Portland more closely resembles the "storm in progress" doctrine than any of the
other doctrines.
140. Id. 12, 704A.2d at 415.
141. 1999 ME 27, 724 A.2d 614.
142. Id. 12, 724 A.2d at 615.
143. Id.
144. Id. 1, 724A.2d at 614-15.
145. Id. 4, 724 A.2d 614. Portions of the jury instructions read:
Any person has a duty to take reasonable care for their own safety. That duty includes
the duty to see that which is to be seen and to exercise reasonable caution regarding
risks which are apparent to be seen .... [T]he owner of the premises has a duty to
warn of or take other reasonable actions to correct or avoid the condition if the owner
should anticipate that persons using the premises will nevertheless encounter the con-
dition or because the person is likely to be distracted.
2003]
admission of the challenged evidence and upheld the verdict for the defendant. 14 6
The case law preceding Budzko set forth several important principles. Isaacson
established that a landowner must exercise reasonable care and provide reason-
ably safe premises. In addition, the duty of reasonable care does not fade if the
danger is obvious, as long as the landowner can reasonably expect that the invitee
will traverse the property regardless of the obvious danger. Isaacson also estab-
lished that landowners are not insurers and must have reasonable notice of the
need to take steps to clear accumulation. Davis held the door open to the possibil-
ity that even while precipitation is still falling, a "reasonable time" may pass be-
fore the landowner may be required to clear his or her property. No case, however,
directly addressed the issue presented in Budzko, and for the first time in 2001, the
Law Court decided whether a landowner owes a duty to business invitees to clear
ice and snow as it is falling.
Il1. THE BuDzKo DECISION-THE FACTS AND HOLDING
On February 27, 1995, Terry Budzko, a UNUM employee working in One
City Center, 14 7 was leaving work around 5:30 p.m. when she slipped and fell on
the stairway landing outside the Monument Square entrance to the building. 14 8 A
storm had progressed throughout the day, 149 resulting in icy, snow packed sur-
faces. 150 The record indicated that One City Center, and not its tenants or its
tenants' employees, was responsible for snow and ice treatment around the build-
ing. 15 1 One City Center had implemented a monthly maintenance procedure for
February, requiring maintenance personnel to "monitor weather reports to be pre-
pared for winter snowfall or ice storms" and "inspect property on a constant basis
for ice build-up on walkways and take whatever measures necessary to keep them
clear." 152 The One City Center maintenance contractor testified that it was neces-
sary to remove snow and ice as it fell during a storm, and that the Monument
Square entrance received first priority. 153
Budzko brought a suit against One City Center, alleging negligence, 154 and
her husband brought a lack of consortium claim. 155 At the close of trial, One City
Center filed a motion requesting judgment as a matter of law, arguing that it was
not under a duty to remove ice or snow as it fell. 156 The court denied the motion
146. Id. 7 8, 10, 724 A.2d at 616. The Law Court reviewed the trial court's refusal to give
amplifying instructions for abuse of discretion. Id. 1 6-7, 724 A.2d 615-16.
147. Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 2001 ME 37, 1 2, 767 A.2d 310, 312.
UNUM corporation was one of the variety of business tenants in the One City Center building.
Id. Approximately 500 to 1000 people entered or exited the building daily. Id.
148. Id. 5, 767 A.2d at 313.
149. Id. 4, 767 A.2d at 312.
150. Id.
151. Id. 3,767 A.2d at 312.
152. Id.
153. Id. 4, 767 A.2d at 312-13.
154. Id. 5, 767 A.2d at 313.
155. Id. 1, n.l 767 A.2d at 312.
156. Id. 8, 767 A.2d at 313. Prior to the trial, One City Center had filed a motion in limine
to exclude evidence that other people slipped or fell around the building on the same day, but at
different times and in different places. Id. 6, 767 A.2d at 313. The trial court never ruled on
the motion. Id. Budzko's counsel referred to one such fall during his opening statement, prompt-
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and the jury returned a verdict for Budzko in the amount of $20,000 and a verdict
for her husband in the amount of $3500.157 One City Center renewed its motion
requesting judgment as a matter of law and also filed a motion for a new trial, both
of which were denied. 158
On appeal, One City Center argued that a business owner does not owe a duty
to business invitees to clear ice and snow as it falls during a storm. 159 Instead,
argued One City Center, business owners may wait until a reasonable time after
the storm has abated to remedy the condition. 160 The Law Court disagreed. While
acknowledging that it had never addressed this specific issue, 16 1 the Law Court
cited Currier v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc.,162 for the proposition that "a business owner
owes a 'positive duty of exercising reasonable care in providing reasonably safe
premises ... when it knows or should have known of a risk to customers on its
premises.' 16 3
The Law Court also cited Dumont v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 164 for the
rule that "a business owner 'who is aware of the existence of a recurrent condition
that poses a potential danger to invitees may not ignore that knowledge and fail
reasonably to respond to the foreseeable danger of the likelihood of a recurrence of
the condition." 165 Coupling these two principles, the Law Court concluded that it
was "evident that a business owner who anticipates that 500 to 1000 invitees may
enter and leave its premises during a snow or ice storm has a duty to reasonably
respond to a foreseeable danger posed to the invitees by a continuing snow or ice
storm." 166 That duty would not be satisfied, the Law Court noted, through One
ing One City Center to object and move for a mistrial. Id. The motion was rejected; however,
the objection was sustained due to the irrelevant nature of the fall because it occurred in a differ-
ent place than Budzko's fall. Id. At several points in the trial both parties questioned witnesses
about the circumstances surrounding the other fall, and Budzko's counsel again mentioned it in
closing arguments, referring to "missing witnesses." Id. 1 6-7, 767 A.2d at 313. One City
Center again moved for a mistrial and was denied. Id. 7, 767 A.2d at 313. One City Center
also appealed this evidentiary issue, arguing that the trial court exceeded the bounds of its dis-
cretion in not granting a mistrial and a new trial. Id.j 17, 767 A.2d at 315. The Law Court held
that the trial court, having heard Budzko's counsel's remarks "'in the context of the entire trial is
in the best position to gauge the reaction of the jury to them."' Id. 18, 767 A.2d at 316 (quoting
Gilmore v. Cent. Maine Power Co., 665 A.2d 666, 669 (Me. 1995)). The Law Court held that
the curative instructions provided by the trial court adequately addressed any prejudice and
affirmed the trial court's decision. Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 2001 ME 37,
18, 767 A.2d at 316.
157. Id. 1, 767 A.2d at 312 n.1.
158. Id. 8,767 A.2d at 313.
159. ld. 11, 767 A.2d at 314.
160. ld. 13 n.3, 767 A.2d at 314 n.3.
161. Id. 11, 767 A.2d at 314.
162. 680A.2d 453 (Me. 1996).
163. Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 2001 ME 37, 11,767 A.2d at 314 (alter-
ation in original) (quoting Currier v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 680 A.2d at 455-56).
164. 664 A.2d 846 (Me. 1995).
165. Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 2001 ME 37, 12, 767 A.2d at 314 (quot-
ing Dumont v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 664 A.2d at 849). Dumont recognized a duty in four
specific situations: (1) where the business owner caused a foreign substance to be on its floor;
(2) where the business owner had actual knowledge of the existence of the foreign substance; (3)
where the business owner was aware of a recurrent condition from a foreign substance that
posed a potential risk to invitees; or (4) where the business owner allowed the foreign substance
to remain on the floor for a period of time such that the owner should have known about it.
Dumont v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 664 A.2d at 848-49.
166. Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 2001 ME 37, 13, 767 A.2d at 314.
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City Center's argument that it could wait until the cessation of the storm to take
action, regardless of the risk posed to invitees during the storm. 167 The Law Court
expressly left open the question of whether a small number of anticipated invitees
would alter the business owner's duty. 16 8
In determining whether or not One City Center fulfilled its duty to "reason-
ably respond to a foreseeable danger posed to the invitees by a continuing snow or
ice storm," the Law Court considered evidence that One City Center knew of the
weather conditions, had maintenance personnel available, had knowledge that 500
to 1000 invitees would enter or exit the building that day, and had failed to treat the
ice with sand or salt, shovel any of the accumulated snow or ice, or warn invitees
of the icy conditions. 169 The Law Court also took into consideration the jury
instruction, which stated that "[a] defendant is not required to remove snow or ice
as it falls but is required to take appropriate corrective action to remove ice and
snow within a reasonable time after the storm has abated.'' 17 0 The Law Court
stated that this instruction may have been more than One City Center was entitled
to because the instruction was based on dictum in Isaacson v. Husson College,1 71
and that dictum had never been established as law in Maine. 172 In affirming the
judgment against One City Center, 17 3 the Law Court stated that the jury had found
One City Center liable despite the beneficial erroneous instruction, 174 and that
One City Center failed to establish that the verdict was "'clearly and manifestly"'
wrong. 175 The resulting rule requires that "[b]usiness owners have a duty to rea-
sonably respond to foreseeable dangers and keep premises reasonably safe when
significant numbers of invitees may be anticipated to enter or leave the premises
during a winter storm."'176
167. Id. If this was truly One City Center's position, it may have been bargaining for more
than some states that have adopted the "storm in progress" doctrine would allow for. See Mattson
v. St. Luke's Hosp. of St. Paul, 89 N.W.2d 743, 745-46 (Minn. 1958) (holding that absent ex-
traordinary circumstances the hospital could wait until after the cessation of the storm); Sinert v.
Olympia & York Dev. Co., 664 A.2d 791, 794 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (holding a defendant may
wait for the cessation of the storm absent unusual circumstances).
168. Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 2001 ME 37, 13, 767 A.2d at 314 n.2.
169. Id. 15, 767 A.2d at 315.
170. Id. 14, 767 A.2d at 315.
171. 297 A.2d 98 (Me. 1995). The following dictum was relied on by the Budzko trial court:
We need not determine in the instant case what steps reasonable care would have
required the corporate defendant to take while the storm was in progress. This was
not the freezing rain or sleetstorm during which, under the general rule, the invitor is
not required to remove the freezing precipitation as it falls, but is only duty bound to
take appropriate corrective action within a reasonable time after the storm has abated.
Id. at 103-04.
172. Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 2001 ME 37, 14, 767 A.2d at 315.
173. Id. 18, 767 A.2d at 316.
174. Id. 14, 767 A.2d at 315.
175. Id. 16, 767 A.2d at 315 (quoting Saucier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1999 ME 197, 18, 742
A.2d 482, 488).
176. Id.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF BUDZKO ON EXISTING CASE LAW
AND ON AN INVITOR'S DUTY OF CARE
A. The Holding in Budzko Comports with Existing Maine Case Law
The Law Court departed from the majority of jurisdictions when it held in
Budzko that "[blusiness owners have a duty to reasonably respond to foreseeable
dangers and keep premises reasonably safe when significant numbers of invitees
may be anticipated to enter or leave the premises during a winter storm." 17 7 The
Law Court did not, however, depart from the principles established in existing
Maine case law. For instance, in Isaacson, the Law Court explained that although
some jurisdictions would relieve the business owner of his or her duty of care
when the dangerous condition was known and obvious, 17 8 Maine would not adopt
a doctrine that would "automatically relieve[ ] the owner or occupier of land from
any duty of care to his business invitee by reason of the invitee's knowledge of the
generally dangerous condition ....- 179 Instead, if the owner or occupier of land
could anticipate that the condition would cause physical harm regardless of the
obvious nature of the condition, then the owner or occupier of land would not be
relieved of his duty of reasonable care. 180 The Law Court applied this principle in
Budzko when it found the defendant liable notwithstanding the obvious and appar-
ent danger to the plaintiff of snow and ice on the Monument Square stairway land-
ing. 18 1
In contrast, several of the jurisdictions that have adopted the "storm in progress"
doctrine have stated that one of the reasons for adopting the doctrine is the known
and obvious danger of snow and ice. 182 As the Supreme Court in Virginia stated,
"[e]very pedestrian who ventures out at such times knows he is risking the chance
of a fall and of a possible serious injury." 183 Considering the significant disparity
between how Maine and jurisdictions that have adopted the "storm in progress"
177. Id.; see cases cited supra note 43.
178. Isaacson v. Husson Coll., 297 A.2d 98, 104 (Me. 1995). The Law Court cited the
following authorities in order to describe the rationale behind the "obvious and apparent" doc-
trine:"In the usual case, there is no obligation to protect the invitee against dangers which
are known to him, or which are so obvious and apparent to him that he may reason-
ably be expected to discover them. Against such conditions it may normally be ex-
pected that the visitor will protect himself."
Id. (quoting PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 403 (3d ed. 1964)). In addition:
"The knowledge of the condition removes the sting of unreasonableness from any
danger that lies in it, and obviousness may be relied on to supply knowledge. Hence
the obvious character of the condition is incompatible with negligence in maintaining
it. If plaintiff happens to be hurt by the condition, he is barred from recovery by lack
of defendant's negligence towards him, no matter how careful plaintiff himself may
have been."
Id. (quoting 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 1491 (1956)).
179. Isaacson v. Husson Coll., 297 A.2d at 104.
180. Id. at 105.
181. See Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 2001 ME 37, 16, 767 A.2d at 315.
182. Walker v. Mem'l Hosp., 45 S.E.2d 898, 907 (Va. 1948); Mattson v. St. Luke's Hosp. of
St. Paul, 89 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn. 1958).
183. Walker v. Mem'l Hosp., 45 S.E.2d at 907.
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doctrine treat the known and obvious nature of snowy and icy conditions, it is not
surprising that Maine declined to adopt the "storm in progress" doctrine. If Maine
had adopted the "storm in progress" doctrine, it would have been inconsistent with
its treatment of known and obvious conditions.
An additional reason that Maine did not adopt the "storm in progress" doc-
trine is that the doctrine is wholly inconsistent with Maine's treatment of foresee-
ability. For example, in Currier v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc.,184 the Law Court stated that
"[a] duty of reasonable care is conferred upon a defendant ... when it knows or
should have known of a risk to [invitees]....,,185 In Dumont v. Shaw's Supermar-
kets, Inc.,186 the Law Court explained that "a [business] owner who is aware of the
existence of a recurrent condition that poses a potential danger to invitees may not
ignore that knowledge and fail reasonably to respond to the foreseeable danger of
the likelihood of a recurrence of the condition." 187 These decisions were central
to the holding in Budzko. 188 In fact, foreseeability is mentioned in the rule fash-
ioned for winter storms: "Business owners have a duty to reasonably respond to
foreseeable dangers .... ,,189
It is precisely because winter storms are expected in Maine, and are therefore
recurring conditions that create foreseeable dangers, that business owners have a
duty to reasonably respond to the danger created by them. It is no answer, as the
Law Court stated in Isaacson, that snow and ice conditions are prevalent during
Maine winter storms 1 90 -the prevalence of these conditions only supports the rule
in Budzko. However, although Maine has remained consistent in its treatment of
"foreseeability," it is important to note that what may be the linchpin of the rule in
Budzko is the exact reason for adopting the "natural accumulation" rule in other
states. 19 1 For example, the Court of Appeals of Ohio states, "'In a climate where
the winter brings frequently recurring storms of snow and rain and sudden and
extreme changes in temperature, these dangerous conditions appear with a fre-
quency and suddenness which defy prevention and, usually, correction."' 192 In
184. 680A.2d 453 (Me. 1996).
185. Id. at 455. Melissa Currier had entered the Bangor Toys 'R' Us branch on a rainy
afternoon in August, 1992 when she slipped and fell on a four-foot-long and a couple-of-feet-
wide "watery mud" film on the ceramic tile floor. Id. at 454. It was known to the store employ-
ees that it was raining outside and that store customers tracked water into the store during such
weather and caused the tile floor to be slippery. Id. Although the floor was mopped at 10 a.m.
that day, no further mopping had taken place when Melissa fell at 2 p.m. Id. The Law Court
held that Toys 'R' Us had constructive notice of a safety hazard and therefore had a duty of
reasonable care to provide a reasonably safe store. Id. at 455.
186. 664 A.2d 846 (Me. 1995).
187. Id. at 849. Dumont slipped and fell on a chocolate-covered peanut while shopping at
the defendant's store. Id. at 847. Shaw's was aware that self-serve, small, loose items create a
risk to customers of slipping and falling and had placed mats next to the grapes, cherries, any
area with ice, the salad bar, and the bouquet racks. Id. No mats were placed near the candy
bins. Id. The Law Court held that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury as to the
reasonable foreseeability of a recurring condition and vacated the judgment for the defendant.
Id. at 849.
188. Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 2001 ME 37, $$ 11-13, 767 A.2d at 314.
189. Id. 16, 767 A.2d at 315 (emphasis added).
190. Isaacson v. Husson Coll., 297 A.2d 98, 103 (Me. 1972).
191. See, e.g., Collins v. Collins, 16 N.E.2d 665, 665 (Mass. 1938).
192. Dailey v. Mayo Family Ltd. P'ship, 684 N.E.2d 746,749 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (quoting
Norwalk v. Tuttle, 76 N.E. 617, 618 (Ohio 1906)).
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other words, although in Maine, the frequent nature of storms leads to the conclu-
sion that business owners have been put on notice and have a duty to remedy icy or
snowy conditions, in Ohio, the frequent nature of storms leads to the conclusion
that requiring a business owner to remedy icy or snowy conditions is unreason-
able.
Therefore, the Law Court remained quite consistent with precedent when it
chose the rule it adopted in Budzko and declined to adopt either the "storm in
progress" doctrine or the "natural accumulation" rule. The rule, however, exposes
Maine business owners to two serious disadvantages over business owners in ju-
risdictions that adopt the "storm in progress doctrine." First, Maine business own-
ers run the risk of having to insure their invitees' safety under the Budzko rule, and
second, Maine business owners are subject to varying degrees of duties of care
depending on how many invitees they expect during a winter storm.
B. Are Maine Business Owners Required to Insure Invitees' Safety?
Whether imposing a duty on business owners to clear ice and snow makes
such business owners insurers of invitees' safety is an issue that is mentioned fre-
quently among the jurisdictions that adopt the "storm in progress" doctrine, 193 in
Michigan, 194 and in the District of Columbia, 195 but is not mentioned anywhere in
Budzko. In the jurisdictions that have mentioned it, discussion has been sparse.
For example, in Minnesota, which has adopted the "storm in progress" doctrine,
the discussion was limited to the following language, "[a]ny rule to the contrary
would impose upon the hospital, as an inviter, a duty of extraordinary care which it
does not have, or erroneously constitute it an insurer of the safety of invitees. ' 196
Likewise, in Rhode Island, which has also adopted the "storm in progress" doc-
trine, the following language constituted the extent of the "insurer" discussion:
"[r]equiring a business owner to remove snow before a storm ends would hold him
to an extraordinary standard of care, forcing him, in effect, to become an insurer of
the safety of business invitees." 197
The two jurisdictions that have rejected the "storm in progress" doctrine give
the topic scarcely any more treatment. In Michigan, the Supreme Court stated,
"[w]hile the invitor is not an absolute insurer of the safety of the invitee, the invitor
has a duty to exercise reasonable care to diminish the hazards of ice and snow
accumulation." 198 In the District of Columbia, the United States Court of Appeals
provided the most discussion:
In adopting this rule, we are not, as counsel say, imposing on the owner of the
premises a burden physically impossible to discharge or one which makes the
owner the guarantor of the safety of his tenants and their guests. We do not hold
there was an absolute duty to provide a safe entrance or to keep it safe by extraor-
dinary or unusual means. If the storm made the spreading of sand or ashes or
193. Munsill v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 2d 214, 221 (D.R.I. 1998); Reuter v. Iowa Trust
Say. Bank, 57 N.W.2d 225,226 (Iowa 1953); Mattson v. St. Luke's Hosp. of St. Paul, 89 N.W.2d
743, 747 (Minn. 1958); Goodman v. Corn Exch. Nat'i Bank & Trust Co., 200 A. 642, 644 (Pa.
1938); Walker v. Mem'l Hosp., 45 S.E.2d 898, 907 (Va. 1948).
194. Quinlivan v. Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co., 235 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Mich. 1975).
195. Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co., 112 F.2d 577, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
196. Mattson v. St. Luke's Hosp. of St. Paul, 89 N.W.2d at 746-47.
197. Munsill v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 221.
198. Quinlivan v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 235 N.W.2d at 740.
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some other preventative impossible or even useless, no reasonable person would
expect it to be done .... All that we hold is that there was a duty in the circum-
stances to be reasonably alert that persons lawfully using the property should be
safeguarded against the danger which could, in the exercise of ordinary care, be
foreseen and prevented. 199
The Law Court in Budzko remained silent on the issue.
However, in Isaacson, the Law Court was clear that "the owner or occupier of
land does not insure safety to business invitees .... ,200 In addition, in Orr v. First
National Stores, Inc.,20 1 the Law Court stated that "[ilt is undoubtedly correct that
a storeowner is without duty to insure safety to a business invitee. ' 202
Therefore, although the question of whether the business owner must insure
his or her invitees' safety is a serious one, the Budzko rule will not likely have that
effect. However, the language in Budzko that intimates that the Law Court would
not require business owners to become insurers raises another issue. The language
that states that business owners who do not expect significant numbers of invitees
may be subject to a lesser duty of care203 raises the issue of whether the Law Court
is imposing duties based not on the status of the plaintiff, as other jurisdictions
do,204 but on the status of the defendant.
C. How Maine Determines the Appropriate Duty of Care
As stated previously, several states fashion the duty the defendant owes on the
status of the plaintiff205 and not on other factors, such as whether the defendant
maintains his or her premises for business purposes. 206 In fact, the majority of
states distinguish between invitee and licensee and impose duties accordingly.207
Maine abolished the distinction between invitees and licensees in 1972 in Poulin v.
199. Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co., 112 F.2d at 579.
200. Isaacson v. Husson Coll., 297 A.2d 98, 103 (Me. 1972).
201. 280A.2d 785 (Me. 1971).
202. id. at 792.
203. Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 2001 ME 37, $ 13, 767 A.2d at 314 n.2.
204. See, e.g., Reuter v. Iowa Trust & Sav. Bank, 57 N.W.2d 225, 226 (Iowa 1953) (stating
that a business landlord will be treated as a general owner of land, and that the duty imposed is
based upon the plaintiff being invited or permitted to use the premises); Walker v. Mem'l Hosp.,
45 S.E.2d 898, 899, 902 (Va. 1948) (making no distinction between a "business establishment,
landlord, carrier, or other inviter" and imposing the duty chosen because "as a visitor [the plain-
tiff] occupied the legal status of an invitee").
205. See, e.g., Reuter v. Iowa Trust & Say. Bank, 57 N.W.2d at 226; Walker v. Mem'l Hosp.,
45 S.E.2d at 899, 902.
206. See, e.g., Sinert v. Olympia & York Dev. Co., 664 A.2d 791,793 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
207. Little v. Bell, 719 So.2d 757, 762-63 (Miss. 1998). The Supreme Court of Mississippi
cites cases from Missouri, Ohio, New Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Oklahoma,
Kentucky, Arkansas, Idaho, Washington, Maryland, Arizona, Florida, Alabama, North Carolina,
Montana, Nebraska, Utah, Oregon, Georgia, Texas, and Colorado. Id. The dissent cites cases
from the following states that have abandoned the common-law standard owed to invitees and
licensees, yet retain the common law standard for trespassers: Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Mexico, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Wiscon-
sin, and Wyoming. Id. at 766-67 (McRae, J., dissenting). Interestingly, both the majority and
the dissent cite to Oregon and Nebraska for opposing positions.
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Colby College.20 8 In Poulin, the Law Court stated that up to that point, the duty
owed by a landowner to a person lawfully on the land was determined by the legal
status of the latter.209 To "those persons present on the land through the owner's
express or implied invitation, either for a purpose connected with the owner's busi-
ness, or for a social visit the landowner owed the positive duty of exercising rea-
sonable care in providing reasonably safe premises for their use."' 2 10 People using
the landowner's property in the above manner were labeled "invitees. ' '2 11 The
court labeled as "licensees":
persons who are neither passengers, servants, nor trespassers, and do not stand in
any contractual relation with the owner of the premises, and are permitted to
come upon the premises for their own interest, convenience or gratification....
the landowner owed only the duty of refraining from willfully, wantonly or reck-
lessly causing him harm.2 12
The Law Court took Poulin as an opportunity to abandon the common law
distinctions between invitees and licensees. 2 13 The recognition that our culture
has changed from one centered around land to one centered in an urban, industrial-
ized setting justified this action.2 14 A further justification for abolishing the cat-
egories was that, "[a] man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protection
by the law... because he has come upon the land of another without permission or
with permission but without a business purpose. '2 15 Accordingly, the Law Court
held "that an owner or occupier of land owes the same duty of reasonable care in
all the circumstances to all persons lawfully on the land."'2 16
208. 402 A.2d 846, 851 (Me. 1972). In Poulin, the plaintiff had accepted a ride to work with
Mr. and Mrs. Tulley. Id. at 848. Mr. Tulley and the plaintiff both worked at Scott Paper Com-
pany and the plan was to drop Mrs. Tulley off at her place of employment, Colby College, and
then travel to Scott Paper Company. Id. Due to icy road conditions, Mr. Tulley was unable to
drive up the hill to the dormitory where Mrs. Tulley worked. Id. The plaintiff exited the vehicle
and walked Mrs. Tulley to the dormitory. Id. When he attempted to re-cross the icy road he fell
and slid down the hill, incurring the injuries that gave rise to the action. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. (internal citations omitted).
213. Id. at 849.
214. Id. at 850. The United States Supreme Court recognized this change when it refused to
incorporate the invitee-licensee distinction into admiralty law:
The distinctions which the common law draws between licensee and invitee were
inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land, a culture which traced many of its
standards to a heritage of feudalism. In an effort to do justice in an industrialized
urban society, with its complex economic and individual relationships, modem com-
mon-law courts have found it necessary to formulate increasingly subtle verbal re-
finements, to create subclassifications among traditional common-law categories, and
to delineate fine gradations in the standards of care which the landowner owes to
each. Yet even within a single jurisdiction, the classifications and subclassifications
bred by the common law have produced confusion and conflict .... Through this
semantic morass the common law has moved, unevenly and with hesitation, towards
"imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty of reasonable care in all the circum-
stances."
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1959) (internal cita-
tions and footnotes omitted).
215. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968).
216. Poulin v. Colby Coll., 402 A.2d at 851.
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Therefore, the fact that the Law Court expressly reserved the question of what
duty would exist to remove ice and snow if a smaller number of invitees were
expected2 17 may run in opposition to the law in several other jurisdictions,2 18 but
is patently consistent with the law in Maine. In other jurisdictions, the number of
people would not be a factor--only those people's status would be. In Maine, the
number of people goes directly to whether it is reasonable to expect a business
owner to clear ice and snow.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note first asked: In declining to adopt "the storm in progress" doctrine,
has the Law Court adopted a rule that forces business owners to insure the safety
of their invitees during a winter storm? The Budzko court did not expressly ad-
dress the issue of whether business owners now assume the duty of insurers. How-
ever, one can surmise that in its interpretation of "reasonable" the Law Court will
not require that business owners shovel every flake of snow or spread sand over
every inch of ice. In addition, by reserving the issue of what standard of care is
reasonable in the situation where a smaller number of invitees are expected, the
Law Court intimated that it may not require the business owner who expects a
smaller number of invitees to clear snow before a storm has abated.
The next questions this Note asked were: Did the Law Court impermissibly
base the imposed duty on the defendant's status as a large business owner, and
what ramifications result from the Budzko decision? The conclusion is that the
Law Court did not impermissibly base the imposed duty on One City Center's
status as a large business owner. Instead, the Law Court properly considered the
defendant's status as a large business owner in determining that it was foreseeable
that a large number of people would be encountering the danger of the accumu-
lated snow on the One City Center property even though the danger was obvious.
Thus, it was reasonable that some remedial action be taken. Because Maine does
not determine duty based solely on the consideration of whether the plaintiff is an
invitee or a licensee, it is appropriate to take into consideration the size of the
business in determining what is reasonable.
Unfortunately, the ramifications of the Budzko decision are not entirely clear.
Business owners in Maine have received little guidance on how long they have
before they must take remedial measures, how often they must take them, or whether
posting a sign indicating that the walkway is slippery will suffice. If the Law
Court had adopted the "storm in progress" doctrine, the ramifications would be
more obvious and Maine business owners would have had a plethora of examples
to guide them in determining what steps would satisfy their duty of care. Deter-
mining duty based on reasonableness leaves room for ambiguity regarding "how
much" and "how often." At the same time, Maine's precedent of taking size into
consideration instead of fashioning the duty according to the plaintiff's status leaves
open questions regarding how large a business must be before the Budzko duty
applies. In short, in the process of answering what must have seemed to the Law
Court to be an obvious call for a remedy for Terry Budzko, the Law Court muddied
217. Budzko v. One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 2001 ME 37, 13, 767 A.2d 310, 314 n.2.
218. See cases cited supra note 205.
[Vol. 55:2
2003] BUDZKO V. ONE CITY CENTER ASSOCIATES 541
the waters for Maine business owners by sculpting a rule that provides little guid-
ance and leaves open many questions that at one point already appeared answered.
Jennifer Williams
